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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
STATE LA\V, NOT FEDERAL LA\\T, CONTROLS IN DETERMINING THE EFFECT OF
THE ACCEPTANCE OF PAY~IENT OF INTEREST AND PRINCIPAL INSTALLMENTS
AFTER NOTICE OF DEFAULT.
The central question to the determination of this
appeal is not whether the Government had authority to
apply the proceeds of the insurance policy differently
than the Government did, nor whether the servicing of
SBA loans is a discretionary function. The question on
appeal is whether the acceptance of interest and principal installments by the Government constituted an
abandonment and waiver of the notice of acceleration
and default which rendered subsequent foreclosure proceedings void.
The question of the effect of the Government's action in accepting payments after notice of default and
acceleration upon a foreclosure suit in the Third District
Court of Utah brought under Utah statutory foreclosure
law is a question of Utah state law and procedure. The
Government chose the forum in this case. The Govern·
ment cannot now be heard to complain because Utah
state law is applied. l\ioreover, as this brief will more
fully develop, under case law precedent, Utah law is
controlling. The cases cited by the Government and,
more importantly, a case decided by the United States
Supreme Court which was overlooked by the Govern·
2

ment's Brief, hold that state law controls on issues such
as are here presented.
The cases cited in the Government's Brief under
Point II beginning at page 10, do not apply to the issue
before the Court. All of the cases cited by the Government are federal cases, brought in federal court, under
federal law, proceeding under federal statutory authority. The choice-of-law question in all of the cases cited
by the Government was whether, under the vagaries of
the Erie Doctrine, the federal court had to apply the law
of the state in which it was sitting. Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, ( 1938) 304 U.S. 64, 82 L.Ed. 1188. What all of
the cases cited by the Government ultimately held was
that in certain defined areas, such as government contracts or securities, a federal court did not have to adopt
a state rule as the rule of decision in a federal case. Of
course, the Erie Doctrine problems do not arise in state
courts. There is no corollary of the Erie Doctrine which
applies to state courts and there could not be, for the
reasoning behind requiring federal courts to follow state
law would make no sense if the state courts themselves
were not allowed to follow state law. In order to achieve
uniformity among federal courts on certain narrow questions, the federal courts have carved out a narrow exception to the general rule. The cases cited by the Government are a fairly exhaustive representation of this
exception. Yet, even under federal precedent, the rule
urged by the Government is too narrow in its scope to be
applied here. On page 14 of the Government's Brief, for
instance, the Government quotes from Cassidy Commis-
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sion Company v. United States (10th Cir. 1967), 387

F.2d 875, in support of the Government's position. A
comparison of the quotation with the text of the original, ,
however, reveals that the case does not argue for so absolute a rule. On page 878 of the Tenth Circuit opinion
we find that interposed between the second and third
sentences of the Government's quote is the following
sentence:
~n. the absence of an applicable act of Congress,
It Is the duty of the federal courts to fashion a
federal rule governing the rights of the United
States under such security instruments as the
chattle mortgage here involved. 387 F'.2d at 878.

The meaning of the quoted passage is considerably
changed by the addition of the omitted sentence. What
the Tenth Circuit was talking about was the right of
federal courts, under certain circumstances, to adopt
their own federal rule of decision. This is a far cry from
saying that a state supreme court must abandon its own
law and adopt as a rule of decision the policy guidelines
of a federal agency.

1

Similarly, the passage quoted in the Government's '
Brief from United States v. Sommerville (3rd Cir.
1964), 324 F.2d 718 (Government's Brief, p. 14) takes
on new meaning when read in context. The quoted pas·
sage ends in a footnote which explains:
Two separate inquiries must be made. The fir~t
is to ascertain if the requisite federal interest IS
present. If there is, .a federal rule may be formu·
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lated. The necessity of uniformity must decide
whether a state la~ should be rejected as the
source for the applicable federal rule. 324 F.2d
at 715, n. 8.
And what is the "requisite federal interest" which
would allow a federal court to ignore the state rule? The
answer, the Company submits, has been fully presented
by the United States Supreme Court in a case which
demonstrates quite clearly that the requisite federal interest would not be present in the instant case. A federal
court, it would seem, presented with this identical appeal,
would adopt the Utah rule.
In the case of United States v. Y azell ( 1966), 382
U.S. 341, 15 L.Ed.2d 404, 86 S.Ct. 500, the United
States Supreme Court was presented with a case involving, as does the instant case, the collection by the Government of a Small Business Administration loan. The
SBA had granted a disaster loan to a husband and wife
in Texas, taking a note secured by a chattle mortgage
accompanied by the wife's separate acknowledgment required by the Texas law of coverture. At that time,
Texas law provided that a wife could not bind her separate property unless she had first obtained a court decree
removing her disability to contract. In the United States
suit on the note the federal district court sustained the
'
wife's plea of coverture. The Fifth Circuit and the
United States Supreme Court affirmed even though the
Supreme Court expressed dislike for the state doctrine.
Many of the same arguments were urged by the Government in Yazell as are presented by the Government

5

in ~his case. All such arguments were rejected by the
Umted States Supreme Court, which held, inter aUa:
Clearly, in the case of these SBA loans there is no
"federal interest" which justifies invading the
peculiarly local jurisdiction of these States in
disregard of their laws, and of the subtleties' reflected by the differences in the laws of the various States which generally reflect important and
carefully evolved state arrangements designed to
serve multiple purposes. 15 L.Ed.2d at 411.
The Court quoted with approval a case in point involving California law:
The Ninth Circuit, in Bumb v. United States,
276 F.2d 729 (CA 9th Cir.), aptly observed in
response to a claim by the Small Business Administration that the 'need for uniformity' excused it
from complying with a California 'bulk sales'
statute requiring notice of intent to mortgage:
"It is true that the Small Business Administra·
tion operates throughout the United States, but
such fact raises no presumption of the desirability
of a uniform federal rule with respect to the va·
lidity of chattle mortgages in pursuance of the
lending program of the Small Business Admin·
istration. The largeness of the business of the
Small Business Administration offers no excuse
for failure to comply with reasonable require·
ments of local law .... It must be assumed that the
Small Business Administration maintains com·
petent personnel fa~ili~r with the la~s of the
various states in which 1t conducts ~usmess, and
who are advised of the steps reqmred by loca1
law in order to acquire a valid security interest
within the various states." 1.5 L.Ed.2d at 407, n.
13, quoting 276 F.2d at 738.
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The Court pointed out that the Small Business Administration's Financial Assistance Manual, SBA-500,
"is replete with admonitions to follow state law carefully," 15 L.Ed.2d at 413, n. 35, and repeatedly emphasized
that the loan, like most SBA loans, was a specially designed transaction not in need of "uniformity rule" protection.
Again, it must be emphasized that this was a
custom-made, hand-tailored, specifically negotiated transaction. It was not a nation-wide act of
the Federal Government, emanating in a single
form from a single source. 15 L.Ed.2d at 408.

And on this point the Court distinguished Clearfield
Trust Company v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 87 L.
Ed. 838, 63 S.Ct. 573, which is relied upon by the Government in the instant case. Id. (see Government's Brief,
p. 12). The other previous United States cases on the
subject were also distinguished on the point that they involved general plans or programs, not individual contracts, and explained on this basis the "necessity of uniformity" doctrine.
The decisions of this Court do not compel or embrace the result sought by the Government. None
of the cases in which this Court has devised and
applied a federal pri~cipal ~f. law superce?in~
state law involved an issue ansmg from an md1vidually negotiated contract. ...
The Court's decisions applying 'federal law' to
supercede state law typic~lly relate to programs
and actions which by their nature are and ~ust
be uniform in character throughout the nation .
. . . 15 L.Ed.2d at 411.
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On the other hand, in the type of case most
closely resembling the present problem state law
has invariably been observed .... 15 L.Ed. at 412
: .. There is here no need for uniformity. Ther~
is no problem in complying with the state law· in
fact, SB~ transactions in each state are specific.
ally and m great detail adapted to state law.
There is in this case no defensible reason to override state law .... 15 L.Ed.2d 413.
In the instant case there is also no defensible reason
to override state law. All of the reasons advanced by the
United States Supreme Court for following state law in
Yazell apply to this case also. This case, as did Y azell,
involves the collection by the Government of an indi·
vidually negotiated SBA administered loan. If this case
were in federal court Yazell would control and Utah
state law would have to be applied by the federal court.
But unlike Y azell and all the cases cited in the Government' s Brief, this case was brought, by the Government, '
in state court. By this fact alone, irrespective of the
compelling Y azell precedent, the Government subjected
itself in this case to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts
and the rule of Utah law. For it is the general rule that
the United States, by coming into state court as a party
plaintiff seeking affirmative relief, accepts the status of
an ordinary litigant with no special privileges. See 91
C.J.S., United States §§ 175, 183, 197; 54 Am.Jur.,
United States § 116; and the cases cited therein, c.f., ·
The Southern Cross, (2d Cir. 1941), 120 F.2d 466 at
468.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
VS

)
)

)

)

Case No. 12459

COLOMBINE COAL COMPANY, ET AL.)

ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS, COLOMBINE COAL COMPANY, ET AL.
Defendants-Appellants respectfully

cite for the consideration of this Court the case
of Walker Bank & Trust Company v. Neilson, 490

P.2d 328 (Utah, 1971), which was decided after
the briefs in this case had been filed.

The proposition to which the Walker
Bank v. Neilson case applies is:
That where money has been made available to pay the amount due on a mortgage prior to
or about the same time as the notice of
acceleration, and where a tender was made and
money paid into court at the foreclosure
proceedings, it is proper to deny foreclosure.
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CONCLUSION
According to the Utah case law precedent cited in
the Appellant's Brief, the notice of acceleration was
waived and vacated, because the Government accepted
payment of interest and principal installments after giving notice of acceleration, and all subsequent proceedings in the foreclosure were void and taken in error.
Utah law, not federal law, is controlling on this point.
The Government must start its foreclosure proceedings
oYer if it wants to foreclose the $300,000 loan. The present order of sale, based upon the combined foreclosure of
both notes, is invalid, and must be set aside. It is respectfully submitted that this case should be remanded
to the trial court for determination of the correct
amounts due and the effect of the Company's tender in
light of the smaller amount due.
Respectfully submitted,
Donald B. Holbrook, Esq.
Edward J. McDonough, Esq. of
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
&McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
800 Walker Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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